

states -- today as Partners and some day as Allies -- will be net contributors to the common good.

To sum up, then, I think these Washington Summit decisions demonstrate that NATO has both the tools and the political will necessary to continue to play its unique role in supporting the security, prosperity and democracy of the Euro-Atlantic area -- through active management of crises where necessary, and through engagement and eventual enlargement to countries, like the Baltics, that share the values on which the Alliance is based.



NATO and the European Security Architecture: An American View

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Marc Grossman

May 20, 1999

I suspect the subject on everyone's mind is NATO's role in the Kosovo crisis and the way ahead in Southeastern Europe. And I certainly look forward to discussing this and answering your questions.

But I'd like to first step back and talk about what President Clinton and Secretary Albright are working to achieve in U.S.-European relations, the important role NATO and other institutions play in our thinking, and then turn to how these principles have been applied in our policy in Kosovo and in the region.

When Secretary Albright invited me to become Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, she asked me to think about a strategy for the U.S.-European relationship for the 21st century -- a strategy that highlighted the way our institutions could meet the challenges ahead and which people on both sides of the Atlantic could support.

That sounds like a large task. But it is based on this simple proposition: one of the lessons of the 20th century is that Europe needs a partnership in which it can count on -- the United States -- and we, in turn, can count on you. While the threats facing us may change, the values and interests that brought us together have not.

American interest in a strategic partnership with Europe did not end with the old Cold War. Whatever challenges the future might bring, the United States and Europe will each be better off if we face them as partners.

With Denmark and our other Allies, we have made three strategic choices over the last decade that have reshaped the U.S.-European relationship.

The first was the decision that the United States should stay in Europe after the end of the Cold War as a European power. That decision was very much a joint one.

The second decision was to open the doors of the U.S.-European partnership to new democracies in the East. We decided that our goal had to be to extend the benefits of U.S.-European cooperation to all of Europe as part of a strategy of building a Europe whole and free.

Third, we chose to update the philosophical foundation and rationale of our partnership. During the Cold War it was often said that the American presence in Europe was needed to keep the continent stable. In short, the U.S. was in Europe to fix Europe. It no longer makes sense to define our role in those terms. Instead, we now think of our presence as part of a broader partnership to work together building security, prosperity and democracy.

That is the kind of partnership we want to build between the U.S. and Europe for the 21st century.

To achieve it, we need to highlight each of our institutions and key relationships: NATO, the U.S.-EU relationship as well as the OSCE.

Over a year ago, we saw that each of these would hold a summit in 1999 that offered an opportunity to talk about its role in the 21st century. And we set for ourselves the goal of using those summits to set out this strategy so that we would be able to step back at the end of the year and say that it all fits together: that we have a new Euro-Atlantic partnership for the 21st century.

For the United States, NATO's role in this overall strategy is clear. It is the institution of choice when the U.S. and Europe choose to act together militarily.

NATO's basic purpose has not changed, nor is there any need to change it. It remains as President Truman described it at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949: a voluntary association of countries that have come together to defend their common values and interests.

What has changed is the strategic environment we face.

At the Washington Summit we set for ourselves a clear, but ambitious benchmark: NATO must be as effective in the future in dealing with new challenges as it was in the past.

To accomplish this goal, Secretary Albright proposed last December -- and the summit adopted -- a package of seven initiatives that we felt were necessary to help prepare NATO for these challenges. We were very glad for Denmark's strong support for all of them.

They included:

- A Washington Declaration, which defines NATO's vision of itself for the 21st century in clear terms that are accessible and comprehensible to both the American and European publics.
- A new Strategic Concept which translates that vision into practice by reaffirming collective defense as NATO's core function while calling for improvements to NATO's capability to undertake new missions.
- A reaffirmed commitment to enlargement and the Open Door Policy, with a robust Membership Action Plan to help aspiring members strengthen their candidacies.
- A Defense Capabilities Initiative to help ensure that NATO has conventional military forces designed and equipped for the full scope of 21st century missions.
- A Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative that boosts NATO's ability to address the threat WMD proliferation poses to NATO populations and military forces.

- A series of proposals designed to take NATO's outreach and cooperation with Partners to the next level by expanding consultations in decision-making and by creating new operational capabilities.
- A European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) initiative that strengthens the European pillar within the Alliance, including enhancing defense capabilities, while also ensuring that Europe can act effectively on its own in those situations where NATO decides not to act.

There are critics both in the U.S. and Europe who suggest that these innovations amount to a radical revision of NATO. But I see it as the adaptation of NATO to the new realities of the post-Cold War era.

If we ask Voltaire's question: if NATO didn't exist would we create it, then our answer would be "yes."

But it would be a different NATO. It would have more members -- that is why we enlarged. It would be focused on the most pressing threats or challenges we are likely to face in the future -- that is why we approved a new strategic concept. It would need to have a much broader set of military capabilities to carry out those missions --that is why our leaders launched DCI and WMD initiatives. It would be more balanced between the United States and Europe -- thus ESDI. And we would certainly want to have good partner-like relations with those countries on our borders that are not members -- thus our Partner initiatives.

Denmark's initiatives through the Partnership for Peace have been at the forefront of strengthening NATO-Partner relations. Denmark's joint military activities with the Baltic States play an essential role in linking them to NATO and the West. I want to commend Defense Minister Hans Heekkerup for making the Partnership for Peace a reality in the entire Nordic-Baltic area.

Americans are at times accused of being NATO-centric. One of our key messages over the last year is that the U.S.-European relationship is about more than NATO and about more than political-military issues. As we think about creating the kind of broader U.S.-European partnership I described earlier, it is clear that the U.S.-EU relationship has a central role to play.

The United States is not a member of the European Union, which is a European organization run by and for Europeans. And many people think of the U.S.-EU relationship first and foremost as a forum to which we turn to manage our most important economic relationship -- in fact, the largest bilateral economic relationship in the world-- with combined trade and investment totaling \$1 trillion annually.

Seven million Americans owe their jobs to transatlantic commerce, and about 3 million Europeans work directly for U.S. firms investing in Europe. It is therefore not surprising that managing that relationship, and the differences on trade issues that inevitably arise, is a major and key piece of the U.S.-EU agenda.

But the EU is about more than trade and the U.S.-EU relationship is about more than managing trade disputes important as they are.

Our strategic interest lies in having a robust Europe capable of acting as an effective partner of the United States.

That's why we have traditionally supported European integration -- from the Marshall Plan, through successive enlargements to the single market and, most recently, in the launch of the single currency.

The EU today is already a major producer of security and stability in Europe and a global actor in many areas. It is working toward a true common foreign and security policy as well as toward common internal security policies on migration, border control, and law enforcement.

We should step up the coordination of our policies in the pursuit of shared values and common interests.

For example, as the EU develops common strategies on issues like Russia and Ukraine, we want to coordinate our own policies with those of the EU. We must focus more on addressing the concerns of our citizens, such as terrorism, international crime, and environmental degradation.

The OSCE will also play a role in creating a secure and increasingly prosperous Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. It was born as CSCE, from a commitment to values that remain vital today -- freedom, democracy, individual rights.

When I first became Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Foreign Minister Niels Helveg-Petersen was the OSCE's Chairman-in-Office. His strong leadership guided the OSCE in addressing the crisis in Albania.

Recent events in Kosovo remind us that most conflict in today's Europe results from the spillover of conflicts within societies rather than between them. Lasting peace in 21st century Europe will depend as much on building a sense of confidence and security among people within democratic societies as it will on security guarantees between democratic nations.

Promoting security within societies is one of the OSCE's strengths. The Helsinki accords remain the basic definition of common goals and standards for how all countries in the new Europe should treat their citizens and each other.

OSCE's framework of commitments in the areas of human rights, economics, arms control, and conflict resolution provides a foundation for constructing this broad democratic community.

The OSCE is our institution of choice for putting these values into practice.

At the OSCE summit in Istanbul this November, our goal is to agree on a charter that will strengthen the relationship of the OSCE with other Euro-Atlantic security

organizations, like NATO, and promote the use of new tools that will capitalize on the OSCE's capabilities.

That's the theory behind our strategy for the U.S.-European relationship for the 21st century.

We are now applying this in practice in Kosovo and Southeast Europe.

Kosovo underscores the need for the U.S.-European partnership and a strong Alliance willing and able to act.

Kosovo also underscores the need for a long-term strategy for the integration of the region in which all of the institutions I've talked about work together.

From the outset of the conflict, President Clinton and other NATO leaders have stated clearly what Belgrade must do to end it. The Kosovars must be able to return home and live in safety. For that to happen, Serb forces must leave: partial withdrawal would only mean continued civil war with Kosovar insurgents. There must be an international security force with NATO at its core: without it, the Kosovars simply will not go home. Their requirements are neither arbitrary nor overreaching. Nor are ours. They are simply what is necessary to make peace work, and that is what we want.

Some question why NATO is in Kosovo. As Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen said at the NATO summit: "This fight -- NATO's fight in Kosovo and FRY is a fight for humanity. A fight for all of us. It is the fundamental question of rights for human beings."

Because NATO stood firm over the last half-century, freedom and security have been consolidated in central Europe, and northeast Europe -- with Denmark's leadership -- is on the road to integration and cooperation.

Now we need to help Southeast Europe move along that path. To do this, we must prevail in the Kosovo conflict, create the necessary secure environment and work together to implement a long-term strategy to stabilize the region and integrate it into the European mainstream.

At the NATO Summit, our leaders gave priority to efforts to stabilize the area. Through the Southeast Europe Initiative, the U.S. and Europe will work together extensively.

We are interested in the forward-looking Southeast Europe Stability Pact proposal put forward recently in the EU by Germany. As our German colleagues rightly note, a strategy for this region must stress several themes --security, prosperity and democracy. To be successful, the effort will require the extensive involvement of all of our key Atlantic institutions.

These key institutions -- NATO, the EU and the OSCE -- complement and sustain each other. Our challenge in this year of summits and beyond will be to assure that

collectively, and as individual members, we help these institutions achieve their potential.

This point is especially important here in Denmark. The need to cooperate on the full range of issues -- from the Baltic region to Europe more broadly -- has brought the U.S. and Denmark closer. U.S.-Danish, as well as U.S.-Nordic relations and cooperation, are better today than at any time in recent history.

The key is participation. Denmark has shown how one Ally can make a difference. Speaking for myself and Secretary Albright, I will emphasize how much we appreciate the contribution Denmark has made to Alliance thinking and action.

Denmark has been in the forefront of NATO's modernizing forces, prepared to look creatively at new missions, at improved integration and capabilities, and at an enhanced Alliance role in arms control and non-proliferation.

And we very much appreciate the strong, highly professional Danish contribution to NATO's efforts in the Balkans -- first in Bosnia and now in Kosovo.

Before closing, I would like to focus on one outcome of the NATO Summit that has important implications for Denmark and the U.S.: NATO's endorsement, in the summit communiqué, of continued efforts to develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the framework of the Alliance.

It is especially important for the United States, which belongs neither to the EU nor the WEU, and for Denmark, which belongs to the EU but not to the WEU, to understand how specific security issues will be handled, when they involve an organization to which we have no direct access.

As I have said, NATO remains the institution of choice whenever we need to act together militarily. However, there might be occasions when NATO will choose not to act, and Europe could step in to defend common values. Then we want the EU to have access to all the resources and capabilities it needs. However, we must ensure that ESDI's development is focused on improving capabilities and does not undermine NATO.

To keep ESDI's enhancement on the right track, we must avoid what we call the "three D's:"

- 1) No Duplication: In developing ESDI, the European Allies must avoid wasting scarce defense funds to duplicate capabilities that already exist within NATO;
- 2) No De-linking: They must avoid de-linking ESDI decision-making from that of NATO, so that NATO continues to be our common institution of first recourse; and,
- 3) No Discrimination: They must not exclude countries that are non-EU and/or non-WEU members.

We have to be inclusive and open to the broadest possible involvement of all of these mutually reinforcing European and Euro-Atlantic institutions in our ongoing efforts to advance security, prosperity and democratic stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic community.



The Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the Threshold of the 21st Century

Ambassador Richard Swett Opening Conference Remarks

May 20, 1999

First of all, let me tell you how delighted I am to be here today to open this conference on "NATO at Fifty: The Alliance on the Threshold of the 21st Century." I am younger than NATO. NATO was founded when my father's generation had fought and won the Second World War for the values of decency and civilization. And I know that without NATO, Europe and the world would have been a less secure and peaceful place. My generation owes a lot to the vision and courage of NATO's founders.

The statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic, that put aside national differences in 1949 to affirm shared values and build the common institutions that define the relations of the U.S. and Europe to this day, were a group of extraordinarily talented and wise people. They had vision and courage, and they backed their principles with power. Their legacy is our gift; their example is our inspiration; and their burdens are now our responsibility, from which we will not shrink.

For we have, as did they, a determination to meet tyranny with strength and to respond to hate with an affirmation of universal values. For we have, as did they, a conception of peace that is not merely the absence of war, but the state in which human freedom may grow and flourish. And we have, as did they, the dedication of thousands of soldiers and sailors and aviators who risk their lives so that future generations may live in security.

As we look to the future, we know that for the first time in history we have a chance to build a Europe truly undivided, peaceful and free. But we know there are challenges to that vision: in the fragility of new democracies; in the proliferation of deadly weapons and terrorism. And, surely, in the awful specter of ethnic cleansing in Southeast Europe where unarmed people are exposed to the blind fury of ethnic hatred, to horrendous crime and to the systematic destruction of their homes and their land.

NATO is in Kosovo because we want to replace ethnic cleansing with tolerance and decency, violence with security, disintegration with restoration, isolation with integration into the rest of the region and the continent. We want Southeastern Europe to travel along the same road as Western Europe did half a century ago, and Central Europe did a decade ago.

This is the mission of NATO at Fifty, as it stands on the edge of a new century. We are determined to reach forward into the future with a united continent, with a collective defense, remaining open to new members from the Baltics to the Black Sea.

We will work with partners for peace and progress, including Russia and the Ukraine, and others who are willing to work for the values and the future we dream of.

America's commitment to NATO and its members remains steadfast. For ten years the Atlantic Alliance has been in the forefront of efforts to ensure that arbitrary divisions of Europe would never happen again. The United States will work with all our partners in NATO to ensure that the organization has the right structures and institutions and the necessary political guidance as expressed in the new Strategic Concept that was adopted last month in Washington.

At the Washington Summit, NATO leaders, including the presidents of the three new member-states Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, convened to work for peace, security and prosperity. We have all learned that conflicts outside the NATO treaty area may demand as much attention as the security of our own territory. It is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between the two kinds of threats. This is the argument that lies at the heart of indivisible, cooperative security in the coming years.

Denmark was one of the original 12 signatory nations to the Washington Treaty in 1949. Today, Denmark's NATO membership enjoys unprecedented support from the people of Denmark. During the last eight years, the Danish Government has contributed significantly to peace keeping operations in the Balkans: in Croatia, in Macedonia, in Bosnia and now in Albania. This would not have been possible without the support of the Folketing and the Danish public.

Denmark, along with the other European allies can also take pride in the fact, that Europe's influence on the alliance has increased significantly over the past years. Like NATO, Europe is changing. The European Union has introduced a common currency as well as a common foreign- and security policy, and it is only natural that NATO should both reflect and support this development.

Numerous initiatives by European governments, on crisis management, cooperation with Russia and issues related to international law, are clearly reflected in the summit document. And as one of the countries to have worked hardest to bring the Baltic countries closer to NATO, Denmark can be especially pleased that the Summit's final document welcomed "continuing efforts and progress" in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a view to preparing them and others for NATO membership.

NATO has always sought to promote peace in our countries. And whenever new opportunities to build lasting peace and stability have arisen, NATO has seized them. Over the past decade, those efforts have brought dramatic rewards. Today, NATO is at the center of a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture as a source of its stability and a source of peace. NATO has extended the hand of friendship to many nations. Former adversaries have become friends. Friends have become partners. Partners have become full members of the Alliance. As President Clinton told NATO's leaders on April 23: "This is the kind of Alliance we seek to build for the future."

In the course of this conference distinguished speakers will present their interpretation of what it means for NATO to turn fifty and add their views and analysis to the discussion. To the speakers, let me say: we are grateful to have you here. We are eager to hear you. The rostrum will soon be yours.

I would also like to thank the organizers of the conference, the Danish Institute of International Affairs and the United States Information Service for their hard work in bringing this about. As I said in the beginning, this jubilee merits our best efforts and DUPI and USIS have certainly done that. Lastly, I want to thank Berlingske Tidende for its generous support of the conference. I know that reporting "the facts, just the facts" is one of the classic virtues of journalism. But I am sure that we will all benefit tremendously from Berlingske Tidende also being part of the action today.

Thank you.



U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ron Asmus Speaks on OSCE's Future

Address to the OSCE Reinforced Permanent Council, Vienna

July 23, 1999

Thank you Mr. Chairman, fellow OSCE colleagues: It is a pleasure for me to be back in Vienna to attend this Reinforced Permanent Council meeting. We come together at an important moment in the OSCE's evolution some four months before our heads of state are scheduled to meet in Istanbul. The United States views this summit as a unique opportunity to lay out our vision of a new Euro-Atlantic partnership for the 21st century, to describe the OSCE's role in that vision, and to strengthen this institution's ability to play that role more effectively in the future. Earlier this week Secretary of State Madeleine Albright addressed these issues in a letter to your ministers outlining U.S. views and goals for the summit. She has asked me to come here and explain American thinking in greater detail.

First, however, it is essential that I recognize and praise our Chairman-in-Office and his representatives for their excellent work. It has been a demanding year, and the months ahead of us will not be any easier. Thank you, gentlemen, we truly appreciate your efforts and welcome your leadership and guidance.

Before I turn to the issue of this summit, I would like to address the OSCE's role in the greatest post-cold war challenge to European security to date -- Kosovo.

While the heroic effort of the KVM [Kosovo Verification Mission], under the leadership of the Chairman-in-Office and Ambassador Bill Walker, could not halt the barbarity of the [Yugoslav President] Milosevic regime, it bought precious time for our negotiators in Rambouillet to try to avert the crisis. Now that the military action in Kosovo has ended, the OSCE will work in partnership with the UN, NATO, the EU and other international organizations to rebuild political, social and economic infrastructures. I also commend the OSCE for placing the Southeast Europe Stability Pact under its auspices, and making the organization's institutions and expertise available to foster stability and security across the region.

Looking ahead to Istanbul, our Heads of State will come together at the dawn of a new millennium and a unique moment in the history of the Euro-Atlantic community. Ten years ago we witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. The origins of the OSCE can, of course, be traced back to the Cold War and the original CSCE that was created during the systemic ideological struggle of that period.

It was a time when we conceived of the greatest threats or challenges to European security in terms of a military attack by one bloc of European states or group of states against the other. Today, we are fortunate enough to no longer live in that Europe. The systemic struggle in Europe ended over a decade ago. In the Charter of Paris all

OSCE member states registered their choice in favor of a common vision of democratic government based on the will of the people and the rule of law.

Since then we have seen great progress toward democracy in many countries, but we have also seen that not all countries have lived up to their commitments. And the failure of some countries to do so has confronted us with some of the greatest challenges to European security in recent decades. The problem is not our vision, as laid out in the Charter of Paris and other OSCE documents. The problem is we have not realized that vision. Instead, over the last decade we have seen horrors and atrocities taking place in Europe of a kind and on a scale that many thought were part of the past. Our experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo have taught us that security in today's Europe rests not only with security between countries but also with security within societies, and that the failure to achieve security within society can affect all of our interests, indeed can affect the overall fabric of European security.

One of the lessons we must draw from the last decade is that a just and durable peace throughout the Euro-Atlantic community in the 21st century will depend as much on building confidence and security among people within democratic societies as on building cooperation among nations. By instilling and reinforcing among all states in the Euro-Atlantic community full respect for human rights, including the rights of individuals belonging to national minorities, we can reduce the likelihood of conflict within and between societies. This makes us all safer, and is what the OSCE does best.

Without abandoning our traditional respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, we must also recognize that what happens within a country that is flagrantly violating OSCE norms can affect each of us and the interests of European security as a whole. As UN Secretary General Annan said in this room just a few days ago, one of the great challenges of the international community is to get states to shift away from an exaggerated emphasis on sovereignty and state security in favor of greater protection of the rights of individuals within states. This is an issue that many of our leaders have struggled with in recent years and which is at the center of our debate over how to best ensure the security of the Euro-Atlantic area in the future. We would be ignoring our responsibilities as signers of the Helsinki final Act and the Charter of Paris if we did not seek to address this issue in an appropriate fashion in the document-charter.

I think we can all agree that there were moments when our leaders wished we had better tools at our disposal for effective preventive crisis management, and an OSCE capable of acting more quickly and effectively. On many occasions our leaders have turned to us and asked if the OSCE had the tools to address a given threat to security. Unfortunately, all too often, the answer has been "no" or "not yet."

As a result, I believe there is today among many countries a growing awareness of the importance of creating security within society and the need for more effective tools for crisis prevention. We now have a unique opportunity to draw the lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo and to apply them to the OSCE. Now is the time for the OSCE to live up to its promise and fulfil its role as our institution of choice for promoting and defending democracy within all participating States. A key safeguard against the need to use military force is an OSCE with a clear vision and the right tools. The risk is that

if we do not seize this opportunity and turn the OSCE into the kind of institution our leaders are looking for, they will look elsewhere for the tools they need to create a more secure and stable Europe.

As a new millennium dawns, the OSCE stands at a crossroads. We can either strengthen this organization and allow it to play the key role it was designed for, or let it lapse into marginalization. The choice is in our hands. In Istanbul we must define our vision for the OSCE's role in Euro-Atlantic security and build on our mutual commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and Charter of Paris.

To that end, we must focus our work and efforts in the months ahead on summit deliverables and new tools that will ensure a stronger and more effective OSCE: First, we must redouble our efforts to complete a summit-worthy document-charter. It should be a concise and publicly accessible document that lays out our vision for the OSCE in the 21st century in a fashion that is understandable to our publics and parliaments. We should aspire to produce a document that can serve as a vision and mission statement or a kind of "strategic concept" for the OSCE, a document that guides this institution's work and institutional development. However, I think we all realize that if we are to achieve this goal we must step up our efforts to find common ground if we hope to achieve a document-charter by Istanbul.

Second, our success in Istanbul will be measured not only in terms of what we say, but what we do to actually strengthen the OSCE's capability to play the role we need it to play if we are to achieve our common vision of the Charter of Paris. It is in this spirit that we have proposed the creation of an OSCE civilian rapid response capability or REACT. Rapid deployment of skilled civilian expertise is essential to effective conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. We must commit to make national contingents of experts, trained to OSCE standards and specifications, available in such OSCE functional areas as democratization, human rights, policing, and elections. These teams could be used as surge capacity in crises, rapid deployment when political agreements are reached, and crisis prevention.

In proposing REACT, I would like to underscore that we do not envision this as an effort to create a new "interventionist" OSCE that will operate by different rules of the game. On the contrary, we believe the rules of the game in the OSCE must remain the same. REACT teams would be sent to the field based on consensus and for a time specified by a Permanent Council decision; extension will require a follow-on PC decision. And, of course, ultimate authority to release experts will always rest with national authorities, and we encourage broad participation by all participating States.

Another tool is strengthened policing capabilities that will allow the OSCE to be our organization of choice for appropriate missions in the OSCE region.

Third, as we look to strengthen the OSCE's operational capabilities we must reaffirm our commitment to the indivisibility of the OSCE area. While our efforts and resources are currently concentrated in Southeastern Europe, we must ensure that the resources and expertise of the OSCE are made available to other regions as well, including Central Asia and the Caucasus. This assistance should include all the appropriate dimensions of the OSCE's work.

Moreover, I'd like to make it clear that our efforts to direct the attention and resources of the OSCE to additional regions is not intended to "singularize" the countries in any specific region but rather to help them integrate into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream.

The OSCE can also help in other ways. Last week, some of you attended an informal meeting, hosted by the U.S., to discuss ways the OSCE could be more effective in facilitating solutions to regional issues in the Caucasus.

This type of creative interaction is essential to successful problem solving, and could serve as a model for invigorating dialogue at the Istanbul summit.

Fourth, we must leverage the resources, skills, and institutions of the OSCE through effective partnerships and cooperation with other international organizations, including NATO and the EU, as well as the UN. Each institution will, of course, retain its independence and autonomy in these non-hierarchical relationships, and no partner will be subordinated to any other. As we see in Kosovo, the benefits of each organization can be multiplied when their efforts are effectively integrated.

Fifth, an important centerpiece of this summit -- affecting the security of all of Europe -- will be signature by Heads of State and Government of the 30 CFE states of an adapted CFE Treaty. Agreement on the critical details of updating and strengthening this Treaty, so central to European security, will demonstrate a renewed common determination on behalf of greater stability and openness. We also hope that the discussions of Vienna Document revision which have been ongoing for more than 2 years will conclude at the Summit with agreement on meaningful steps to enhance its provisions.

Sixth, I hope we can work together to produce a format for this summit that reflects our commitment to not only strengthen this institution for the 21st century but also to make it more relevant to our publics. We want it to be not only a ceremonial summit, but also a working one. I support the ideas of the Chairman-in-Office for looking at ways to shorten the plenary session and go beyond the delivery of rehearsed speeches and encourage more exchanges between our leaders. Avoiding an endless talkathon is the best way to bring the OSCE's mission to life for our leaders and our publics.

Given the unique history and responsibilities of the OSCE, we should also look at methods to reach out to NGOs and find the appropriate way to include them in our deliberations.

Finally, let me turn to the issue of a possible OSCE role in connection with peacekeeping, an issue where I know there are a variety of different views represented around this table.

We, the U.S., stand ready to examine this question with an open mind. We have had a decade of peacekeeping/peacemaking operations in Europe and can learn from those. Our conclusion from this decade of experience can be summed up as follows: We believe that the OSCE has a critical role to play in peacekeeping but that this role should focus first and foremost on the OSCE as the crucial civilian partner in peacekeeping, not as the institution that actually provides the military capability for such operations. This does not reflect any desire by the U.S. to constrain the OSCE,

but simply reflects the realities regarding the capabilities of the organization. Our priorities should be to avoid wasteful duplication, make use of the comparative advantage of existing institutions and ensure they work together in a non-hierarchical fashion.

Speaking for the United States, it is not a state secret to say that if American troops are to be involved in a future peacekeeping operation in the Euro-Atlantic area, we will look to NATO as in Bosnia and Kosovo, to take the lead in putting together such an operation. Indeed, a NATO umbrella is likely to be the sine-quo-non for the participation of U.S. combat troops in any such operation.

At the same time, we realize that there may be future scenarios where NATO might not be the appropriate institution to lead such an operation and where U.S. forces will not be participating but where the U.S. also has a clear interest in ensuring that such an operation be effective and succeed. In these situations, we need to explore options for appropriate roles for the OSCE, in conjunction with the UN and EU.

In closing, let me say that we have considerable work to do between now and November. We have the talent to get the job done if we approach it in the spirit of cooperation. The U.S. is committed to doing its part and working together with you.

Enjoy the summer break, you have all earned it. I look forward to a productive autumn and to a successful summit in Istanbul.



An American Perspective on Regional Integration

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott

March 5, 1999

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to express my appreciation to you personally, and, through you, to the people of Norway and especially to the people of Bodo for making your guests feel so welcome. For an American making his first visit here -- and certainly for one who is both a student and a child of the Cold War -- there is a special fascination in coming here to this lovely town.

Nearly 40 years ago, on a bright, spring day in 1960, Bodo airfield, where most of us landed in the last 24 hours, was the intended destination of an American pilot named Francis Gary Powers, who had taken off the day before from a base in Peshawar, Pakistan. Mr. Powers, of course, never made it to Bodo. He and his U-2 came to earth near Svedlovsk, thus triggering one of the more spectacular and dangerous confrontations of that bygone era. Today, Bodo itself is a testament to how much the world -- and this region -- have changed. As all of us can see, Bodo is teeming with shipping, fishing, commerce and other activities that serve to bring together the people and the interests of Norway, Finland, Sweden, Russia and all the states represented here. As a vigorous nexus of regional interaction and integration, Bodo is an ideal venue for this meeting.

I was fortunate enough to represent the United States at last year's gathering of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in Lulea, and I welcome the chance yet again to affirm, on a continuing basis, my country's support for the Council's work. We do so as part of our own Northern European Initiative, or NEI. I'm joined here by my friend and colleague Ron Asmus, well known to many of you as the moving force behind the NEI.

Along with the U.S.'s involvement in the Council of Baltic Sea States, our observer status in this body is part of a larger commitment to helping build an inclusive Euro-Arctic community that reaches from Barents to the Adriatic -- and from the North Sea to the Pacific. In this region, as in others, the guiding principle of our contribution is simple: we will offer help in specific areas where we can truly provide added value.

One such area is nuclear waste management and safety. Last year in Lulea, I announced that my government would contribute \$500,000 toward the construction of a prototype containment cask in Murmansk for the interim storage of damaged fuel from nuclear-powered vessels. Since then, Norway, Sweden and Finland, the United Kingdom, as well as the European Commission and the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation, have all contributed generously to this effort. I am pleased to announce today that my government will be contributing an additional \$500,000 to this important project.

Before finishing our work here, we will all be signing a landmark document on reactor safety and the sound management of nuclear waste. Later this month, the U.S.,

Norway and Russia will begin work on an important trilateral agreement to provide the legal protections enabling our countries to intensify our cooperation in nuclear waste management. We've set ourselves the target of concluding that agreement before the end of this year.

Meanwhile, our joint project with Russia and Norway on the Murmansk liquid waste treatment facility is nearing completion -- we hope by August -- so that Russia will then be able to adhere to the London Dumping Convention protocol's prohibition against the disposal of nuclear material at sea. Finally, we have recently reached agreement with Norway and Russia on a new project under the auspices of the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation program to build a mobile liquid waste treatment facility to help manage those liquid wastes that cannot be safely transported. These and other efforts address one of the most dangerous legacies of the Cold War -- one that has special salience for the all the citizens of this region. The problem transcends existing national borders, not to mention now-defunct ideological divides. By the same token, the collective search for a solution proves that the governments represented here are rolling up their sleeves and -- in the most literal as well as the most symbolic sense -- burying the worst of the past, thus clearing the way for the best of the future.

The work of governments depends on the dedication of individuals. In that regard, let me say that the United States is fortunate to have public servants like Alan Hecht of the Environmental Protection Agency and Carol Kessler, Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Reactor Safety at the State Department, working on these programs back in Washington. They are here today in Bodo.

Let me now turn to several other regional activities in which my country has been engaged under the rubric of the Northern European Initiative. Some of them are outside the ambit of the Barents Council, but they are all aimed at supporting the Council's objective of strengthening ties through this region.

Since Lulea, the United States has assumed the chair of the Arctic Council -- another good example of a new mechanism for regional cooperation that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. We are continuing the good work of the previous chair, Canada, in shifting the focus of Arctic activities from issues of military security to what might be called the new agenda of environmental protection and economic development. We have put forward initiatives aimed at ending the use of PCB's, reducing pollution in and around the Arctic Ocean, and promoting sustainable development.

In May, senior officials from eight Arctic Council member states will meet in Anchorage. Mr. Chairman, I would urge that the Barents Council -- perhaps through the good offices of (the) new Finnish chair -- consider submitting a report on the good work you've done here so that the Arctic Council can learn from, and build on, your experience. We have, in short, a perfect example -- and a perfect opportunity -- for different organizations, with overlapping memberships and missions, to reinforce each other.

One of many areas where we can develop that kind of synergy is in the safeguarding of public health. At the Anchorage meeting, there will be a chance to hear more about

Alaska's proposal on Arctic Telemedicine -- an initiative that puts doctors and patients in touch with each other over the Internet. The Telemedicine project is of value to all the populations of the region, but perhaps especially, the Sami and other indigenous peoples.

If health hazards like tuberculosis and other infectious diseases are a common threat requiring common action, so is organized crime. Under the Northern European Initiative, U.S. law enforcement agencies are participating in the joint effort to combat cross-border car theft, money laundering and smuggling. It was in this connection that Louis Freeh, the director of the FBI, has made several visits to many of the countries gathered here.

Finally, I would mention another area of common interest: the promotion of opportunities for women throughout this region. Next week in Riga, the U.S. and Finland will co-sponsor an experts conference on these issues. That event, which owes much to the personal concern and initiative of our friend Tarja Halonen, will focus on both the good news and the bad news -- that is, on the rich prospects for women's entrepreneurship, but also on the stubborn and daunting challenges posed by domestic violence and international trafficking in prostitution.

The U.S. government will also co-sponsor a major regional conference on Women and Democracy in Iceland in October. Thanks to the generosity and leadership of the Icelandic government, participants from governments, the private sector and non-governmental organizations from the Nordic and Baltic countries, from Russia and the United States, will have a chance to develop common strategies for overcoming barriers to women's participation in the economy and civil society. Our First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, is delighted to accept an invitation to participate.

I need hardly add this project has the full backing of my boss, the Secretary of State. But so do all the projects we are discussing today. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, in addition to conveying her greetings to you and to all her colleagues assembled here, Secretary Albright has asked me to underscore her admiration for the work of this organization. She sees the Barents Euro-Arctic Council as a key building block in a larger cause to which she has devoted much of her own energy and commitment: the transformation of Europe as a whole from division to integration, from confrontation to cooperation - a transformation that the town of Bodo itself so vividly dramatizes, and a transformation that this Council has done so much to advance.



**Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Ambassador Designate Barbara Griffiths**

July 21, 1999

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as President Clinton's nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Iceland. It is an enormous honor to be considered for a posting as Ambassador, and I am grateful to the President and Secretary Albright for the confidence they have shown in me. Let me take the opportunity to introduce my husband David Schoonover, who is a senior Foreign Service officer in USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service. He will be my partner in this assignment if the Senate confirms my nomination.

Mr. Chairman, the United States and Iceland enjoy excellent and expanding relations. Iceland was a founding member of NATO, and has been a staunch ally of U.S. objectives within NATO. Under the terms of our 1951 Defense Cooperation Agreement, the United States established a military presence at Keflavik Naval Air Station and agreed to provide for Iceland's defense. In exchange, Iceland makes available to the United States and to NATO rent-free basing facilities. The current Agreed Minute which governs our joint commitments will expire in 2001, the 50th anniversary of the bilateral defense relationship, and we will be seeking to expand cooperation and to lower costs.

Iceland's geographic position in the North Atlantic offers NATO-based forces an important strategic advantage. Iceland also has emerged as an important NATO partner in multilateral security activities, such as in Bosnia and, more recently, in Kosovo. Iceland's population stands at 265,000, but it steps up and carries its fair share in proportion to other NATO members.

Over the course of my 22-year career in the Foreign Service, I have worked extensively on countries facing challenges to economic and political stability. Most recently, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development, and earlier as Minister Counselor at our embassies in Moscow and Seoul, I came to appreciate the critical role of democratic and market-based institutions that can support and sustain economic growth and adapt to democratic change. Iceland has deep historic roots as a democratic republic and founded Europe's first parliament in 930.

Despite many years of foreign rule, Icelanders retained a fierce independent spirit and regained full independence as a nation in 1944. Only in this decade, however, has the Government of Iceland undertaken both policy and structural changes to stabilize the economy and reduce dependence on exports of marine products. While fish products still account for 70% of exports, growth areas in the economy include tourism, energy intensive industry, and services, such as software. Policies of fiscal discipline, privatization and economic liberalization have combined to place Iceland among the fastest growing economies in Europe for the past three years, and inflation and unemployment are at low levels. The liberalization also is opening new opportunities

for U.S. exporters and investors. U.S. exports to Iceland totaled \$237 million in 1998 and grew by nearly a third over 1997 levels.

As in the security and economic relationship, cooperation between the United States and Iceland is deepening to advance other mutual goals. Icelanders also have strong emotional ties with the Baltic States and now are contributing funding and training to the U.S. Government's Northern European Initiative, which promotes Baltic and Russian integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. First Lady Hillary Clinton will address a conference this October in Reykjavik on women and democracy hosted by the Icelandic Government in cooperation with the Vital Voices Initiative and the Nordic Council. In the environmental area, Iceland strongly supports the U.S. positions in multilateral negotiations regarding climate change and the reduction of persistent organic pollutants, and cooperates with the U.S. in the Arctic Council, which the United States currently chairs.

If the Senate confirms my nomination, I look forward to working with Congress to enhance the U.S.-Icelandic relationship, and to continue our valued partnership with Iceland in building a more prosperous, united, and secure Europe. Thank you. I now would be pleased to respond to your questions.



A Charter of Partnership Among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania

The text of this charter was released by the White House after the official signing ceremony in the East Room on the same day by the presidents of the four signatory nations.

January 16, 1998

Preamble: The United States of America, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania, hereafter referred to as Partners.

Sharing a common vision of a peaceful and increasingly integrated Europe, free of divisions, dedicated to democracy, the rule of law, free markets, and respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people;

Recognizing the historic opportunity to build a new Europe, in which each state is secure in its internationally-recognized borders and respects the independence and territorial integrity of all members of the transatlantic community;

Determined to strengthen their bilateral relations as a contribution to building this new Europe, and to enhance the security of all states through the adaptation and enlargement of European and transatlantic institutions;

Committed to the full development of human potential within just and inclusive societies attentive to the promotion of harmonious and equitable relations among individuals belonging to diverse ethnic and religious groups;

Avowing a common interest in developing cooperative, mutually respectful relations with all other states in the region;

Recalling the friendly relations that have been continuously maintained between the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania since 1922;

Further recalling that the United States of America never recognized the forcible incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the USSR in 1940 but rather regards their statehood as uninterrupted since the establishment of their independence, a policy which the United States has restated continuously for five decades;

Celebrating the rich contributions that immigrants from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have made to the multi-ethnic culture of the United States of America, as well as the European heritage enjoyed by the United States as a beneficiary of the contributions of intellectuals, artists, and Hanseatic traders from the Baltic states to the development

of Europe; praising the contributions of U.S. citizens to the liberation and rebuilding of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Affirm as a political commitment declared at the highest level, the following principles and procedures to guide their individual and joint efforts to achieve the goals of this Charter.

Principles of Partnership: The United States of America has a real, profound and enduring interest in the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

The United States of America warmly welcomes the success of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in regaining their freedom and resuming their rightful places in the community of nations.

The United States of America respects the sacrifices and hardships undertaken by the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to re-establish their independence. It encourages efforts by these states to continue to expand their political, economic, security, and social ties with other nations as full members of the transatlantic community.

The partners affirm their commitment to the rule of law as a foundation for a transatlantic community of free and democratic nations, and to the responsibility of all just societies to protect and respect the human rights and civil liberties of all individuals residing within their territories.

The partners underscore their shared commitment to the principles and obligations contained in the United Nations Charter.

The partners reaffirm their shared commitment to the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.

The partners will observe in good faith their commitments to promote and respect the standards for human rights embodied in the above-mentioned Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents and in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. They will implement their legislation protecting such human rights fully and equitably.

The United States of America commends the measures taken by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to advance the integration of Europe by establishing close cooperative relations among themselves and with their neighbors, as well as their promotion of regional cooperation through their participation in fora such as the Baltic Assembly, Baltic Council of Ministers, and the Council of Baltic Sea States.

Viewing good neighborly relations as fundamental to overall security and stability in the transatlantic community, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reaffirm their determination to further enhance bilateral relations between themselves and with other neighboring states.

The partners will intensify their efforts to promote the security, prosperity, and stability of the region. The partners will draw on the points noted below in focusing their efforts to deepen the integration of the Baltic states into transatlantic and European institutions, promote cooperation in security and defense, and develop the economies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

A Commitment to Integration: As part of a common vision of a Europe whole and free, the partners declare that their shared goal is the full integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into European and transatlantic political, economic, security and defense institutions. Europe will not be fully secure unless Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each are secure.

The partners reaffirm their commitment to the principle, established in the Helsinki Final Act, repeated in the Budapest and Lisbon OSCE summit declarations, and also contained in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible.

The partners further share a commitment to the core principle, also articulated in the OSCE Code of Conduct and reiterated in subsequent OSCE summit declarations, that each state has the inherent right to individual and collective self-defense as well as the right freely to choose its own security arrangements, including treaties of alliance.

The partners support the vital role being played by a number of complementary institutions and bodies -- including the OSCE, the European Union (EU), the West European Union (WEU) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Council of Europe (COE), and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) -- in achieving the partners' shared goal of an integrated, secure, and undivided Europe.

They believe that, irrespective of factors related to history or geography, such institutions should be open to all European democracies willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities and obligations of membership, as determined by those institutions.

The Partners welcome a strong and vibrant OSCE dedicated to promoting democratic institutions, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. They strongly support the OSCE's role as a mechanism to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and crises.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each reaffirm their goal to become full members of all European and transatlantic institutions, including the European Union and NATO.

The United States of America recalls its longstanding support for the enlargement of the EU, affirming it as a core institution in the new Europe and declaring that a stronger, larger, and outward-looking European Union will further security and prosperity for all of Europe.

The Partners believe that the enlargement of NATO will enhance the security of the United States, Canada, and all the countries in Europe, including those states not immediately invited to membership or not currently interested in membership.

The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance.

The United States of America reiterates its view that the enlargement of NATO is an on-going process. It looks forward to future enlargements, and remains convinced that not only will NATO's door remain open to new members, but that the first countries invited to membership will not be the last. No non-NATO country has a veto over Alliance decisions. The United States notes the Alliance is prepared to strengthen its consultations with aspirant countries on the full range of issues related to possible NATO membership.

The Partners welcome the results of the Madrid Summit. They support the Alliance's commitment to an open door policy and welcome the Alliance's recognition of the Baltic states as aspiring members of NATO. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania pledge to deepen their close relations with the Alliance through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the intensified dialogue process.

The partners underscore their interest in Russia's democratic and stable development and support a strengthened NATO-Russia relationship as a core element of their shared vision of a new and peaceful Europe. They welcome the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter, both of which further improve European security.

Security Cooperation: The partners will consult together, as well as with other countries, in the event that a partner perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened or at risk. The partners will use bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for such consultations.

The United States welcomes and appreciates the contributions that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have already made to European security through the peaceful restoration of independence and their active participation in the Partnership for Peace. The United States also welcomes their contributions to IFOR, SFOR, and other international peacekeeping missions.

Building on the existing cooperation among their respective ministries of defense and armed forces, the United States of America supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to provide for their legitimate defense needs, including development of appropriate and interoperable military forces.

The Partners welcome the establishment of the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) as an effective body for international coordination of security assistance to Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's defense forces.

The partners will cooperate further in the development and expansion of defense initiatives such as the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BaltBat), the Baltic Squadron (Baltron), and the Baltic airspace management regime (BaltNet), which provide a

tangible demonstration of practical cooperation enhancing the common security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the transatlantic community.

The partners intend to continue mutually beneficial military cooperation and will maintain regular consultations, using the established Bilateral Working Group on Defense and Military Relations.

Economic Cooperation: The partners affirm their commitment to free market mechanisms as the best means to meet the material needs of their people.

The United States of America commends the substantial progress its Baltic Partners have made to implement economic reform and development and their transition to free market economies.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania emphasize their intention to deepen their economic integration with Europe and the global economy, based on the principles of free movement of people, goods, capital and services.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania underscore their commitment to continue market-oriented economic reforms and to express their resolve to achieve full integration into global economic bodies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) while creating conditions for smoothly acceding to the European Union.

Noting this objective, the United States of America will work to facilitate the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with the world economy and appropriate international economic organizations, in particular the WTO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), on appropriate commercial terms.

The Partners will work individually and together to develop legal and financial conditions in their countries conducive to international investment. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania welcome U.S. investment in their economies.

The Partners will continue to strive for mutually advantageous economic relations building on the principles of equality and non-discrimination to create the conditions necessary for such cooperation.

The Partners will commence regular consultations to further cooperation and provide for regular assessment of progress in the areas of economic development, trade, investment, and related fields. These consultations will be chaired at the appropriately high level.

Recognizing that combating international organized crime requires a multilateral effort, the partners agree to cooperate fully in the fight against this threat to the world economy and political stability. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain committed to developing sound legislation in this field and to enhance the implementation of this legislation through the strengthening of a fair and well-functioning judicial system.

The U.S.-Baltic Relationship: In all of these spheres of common endeavor, the reaffirm their commitment to a rich and dynamic Baltic-American partnership for the 21st century.

defense, cultural, and environmental affairs as contributing to closer ties between their people and facilitating the full integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into

In order to further strengthen these ties, the Partners will establish a Partnership Commission chaired at the appropriately high level to evaluate common efforts. This

assess results of bilateral consultations on economic, military and other areas, and review progress achieved towards meeting the goals of this Charter.

security environment, signing Partners are committed regularly at the highest level to review this agreement.



The Alliance's Strategic Concept

Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.

April 23 and 24, 1999

1. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance's new Strategic Concept.
2. NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and prevented war in Europe during the 40 years of the Cold War. By combining defense with dialogue, it played an indispensable role in bringing East-West confrontation to a peaceful end. The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War were reflected in the Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept. There have, however, been further profound political and security developments since then.
3. The dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new Europe of greater integration is emerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part. The Alliance has been at the heart of efforts to establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and has committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider stability. It has shown the depth of that commitment in its efforts to put an end to the immense human suffering created by conflict in the Balkans. The years since the end of the Cold War have also witnessed important developments in arms control, a process to which the Alliance is fully committed. The Alliance's role in these positive developments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation of its approach to security and of its procedures and structures. The last ten years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
4. The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It has, therefore, a demanding agenda. It must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defense and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.
5. This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues this agenda. It expresses NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces.

PART I - THE PURPOSE AND TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

6. NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defense of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.

7. The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

8. The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defense, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realize their essential national security objectives.

9. The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefits for its members alone, but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives.

10. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defense: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.
- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

11. In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country's adversary.

PART II - STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES

THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

12. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organizations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

13. In parallel, NATO has successfully adapted to enhance its ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Internal reform has included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the creation of arrangements to permit the rapid deployment of forces for the full range of the Alliance's missions, and the building of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.

14. The United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) have made distinctive contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Mutually reinforcing organizations have become a central feature of the security environment.

15. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

16. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive security organization in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing cooperative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical cooperation, especially with regard to the international effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.

17. The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defense dimension. This process will have implications for the entire Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU. The development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the progressive framing of a common defense policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty. Important steps taken in this context include the

incorporation of the WEU's Petersberg tasks into the Treaty on European Union and the development of closer institutional relations with the WEU.

18. As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. To this end, the Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put into place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defense enhances the security environment of the Alliance.

19. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements support NATO's political and military efforts to achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies have played a major part in the significant achievements in this field. These include the enhanced stability produced by the CFE Treaty, the deep reductions in nuclear weapons provided for in the START treaties; the signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the accession to it of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as non-nuclear weapons states, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines and similar agreements make an important contribution to alleviating human suffering. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional weapons and with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons.

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RISKS

20. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighboring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.

21. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.

22. The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance recognizes that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. Some states, including on NATO's periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

23. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance's growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO's superiority in traditional weaponry.

24. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.

PART III – THE APPROACH TO SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

25. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organizations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance's contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organizations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

26. The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defense and to fulfil the full range of its missions; the development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successfully; its continued openness to new members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other nations as part of its co-operative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK

NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible. Thus the Alliance's commitment to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defense of its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

THE MAINTENANCE OF ALLIANCE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

28. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defense remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, remains at the core of the Alliance's ability to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success.

29. Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. These missions can be highly demanding and can place a premium on the same political and military qualities, such as cohesion, multinational training, and extensive prior planning, that would be essential in an Article 5 situation. Accordingly, while they may pose special

requirements, they will be handled through a common set of Alliance structures and procedures.

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

30. The Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defense of its members and through which common security objectives will be pursued wherever possible, remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defense field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defense Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

31. In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO's Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans. Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

32. NATO will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organizations to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage. A coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance, will require the Alliance's political authorities to choose and co-ordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages.

PARTNERSHIP, COOPERATION, AND DIALOGUE

33. Through its active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive force in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Through outreach and openness, the Alliance seeks to preserve peace, support and promote democracy, contribute to prosperity and progress, and foster genuine partnership with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict.

34. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO's cooperation with its Partners. It offers an expanded political dimension for both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities, including in civil emergency planning, and scientific and environmental affairs.

35. The Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO. Through detailed programs that reflect individual Partners' capacities and interests, Allies and Partners work towards transparency in national defense planning and budgeting; democratic control of defense forces; preparedness for civil disasters and other emergencies; and the development of the ability to work together, including in NATO-led PfP operations. The Alliance is committed to increasing the role the Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and making PfP more operational. NATO has undertaken to consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

36. Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

37. Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values. NATO is committed to further strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues of common concern and a broad range of practical cooperation activities. The Alliance continues to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in central and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.

38. The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO's co-operative approach to security. It provides a framework for confidence building, promotes transparency and cooperation in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts. The Alliance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil, and military aspects of the Dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue.

ENLARGEMENT

39. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. To this end, NATO has established a program of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership in the context of its wider relationship with them. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.

ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND NON-PROLIFERATION

40. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance's ability to provide for collective defense and to fulfil the full range of its missions. The Alliance will continue to ensure that - as an important part of its broad approach to security - defense and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. The Alliance will continue to actively contribute to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as to confidence and security building measures. The Allies take seriously their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Alliance attaches great importance to the continuing validity and the full implementation by all parties of the CFE Treaty as an essential element in ensuring the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

PART IV - GUIDELINES FOR THE ALLIANCE'S FORCES

PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY

41. The Alliance will maintain the necessary military capabilities to accomplish the full range of NATO's missions. The principles of Allied solidarity and strategic unity remain paramount for all Alliance missions. Alliance forces must safeguard NATO's military effectiveness and freedom of action. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. With respect to collective defense under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the combined military forces of the Alliance must be capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stopping an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur, and of ensuring the political independence and territorial integrity of its member states. They must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's forces have essential roles in fostering cooperation and understanding with NATO's Partners and other states, particularly in helping Partners to prepare for potential participation in NATO-led PfP operations. Thus they contribute to the preservation of peace, to the safeguarding of common security interests of Alliance members, and to the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use of NBC weapons, they contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means.

42. The achievement of the Alliance's aims depends critically on the equitable sharing of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defense. The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. The North American Allies contribute to the Alliance through military forces available for Alliance missions, through their broader contribution to international peace and security, and through the provision of unique training facilities on the North American continent. The European Allies also make wide-ranging and substantial contributions. As the process of developing the ESDI within the Alliance progresses, the European Allies will further enhance their contribution to the common defense and to international peace and stability including through multinational formations.

43. The principle of collective effort in Alliance defense is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defense, and prevent the renationalisation of defense policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements also enable NATO's forces to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations and constitute a prerequisite for a coherent Alliance response to all possible contingencies. They are based on procedures for consultation, an integrated military structure, and on co-operation agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common funding; common operational planning; multinational formations, headquarters and command arrangements; an integrated air defense system; a balance of roles and responsibilities among the Allies; the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory when required; arrangements, including planning, for crisis management and reinforcement; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined doctrines and exercises when appropriate; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation. The inclusion of NATO's

Partners in such arrangements or the development of similar arrangements for them, in appropriate areas, is also instrumental in enhancing cooperation and common efforts in Euro-Atlantic security matters.

44. Multinational funding, including through the Military Budget and the NATO Security Investment Program, will continue to play an important role in acquiring and maintaining necessary assets and capabilities. The management of resources should be guided by the military requirements of the Alliance as they evolve.

45. The Alliance supports the further development of the ESDI within the Alliance, including by being prepared to make available assets and capabilities for operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed.

46. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

THE ALLIANCE'S FORCE POSTURE

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

47. The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance's forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and – in case of conflict – to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defense while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

48. The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organizations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security.

49. In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defense missions.

Well-trained and well-equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed. The potential participation of Partners and other non-NATO nations in NATO-led operations as well as possible operations with Russia would be further valuable elements of NATO's contribution to managing crises that affect Euro-Atlantic security.

50. Alliance military forces also contribute to promoting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by their participation in military-to-military contacts and in other cooperation activities and exercises under the Partnership for Peace as well as those organized to deepen NATO's relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. They contribute to stability and understanding by participating in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements and in humanitarian de-mining. Key areas of consultation and cooperation could include inter alia: training and exercises, interoperability, civil-military relations, concept and doctrine development, defense planning, crisis management, proliferation issues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in operational planning and operations.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture

51. To implement the Alliance's fundamental security tasks and the principles of its strategy, the forces of the Alliance must continue to be adapted to meet the requirements of the full range of Alliance missions effectively and to respond to future challenges. The posture of Allies' forces, building on the strengths of different national defense structures, will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

52. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defense and to conduct crisis response operations, sometimes at short notice, distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies' territory. The characteristics of the Alliance's forces will also reflect the provisions of relevant arms control agreements. Alliance forces must be adequate in strength and capabilities to deter and counter aggression against any Ally. They must be interoperable and have appropriate doctrines and technologies. They must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and be capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and combined operations, which may also include Partners and other non-NATO nations.

53. This means in particular:

a. that the overall size of the Allies' forces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of collective defense and other Alliance missions; they will be held at appropriate and graduated readiness;

b. that the peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory and waters and forward deployment of forces when and where necessary. Regional and, in particular, geostrategic considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as instabilities on NATO's periphery could lead to crises or conflicts requiring an Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times;

c. that NATO's command structure will be able to undertake command and control of the full range of the Alliance's military missions including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and multiservice forces. It will also be able to support operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations in which Partners and other countries may participate;

d. that overall, the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and for the full range of its missions, require essential operational capabilities such as an effective engagement capability; deployability and mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and sustainability, incorporating logistics and force rotation. To develop these capabilities to their full potential for multinational operations, interoperability, including human factors, the use of appropriate advanced technology, the maintenance of information superiority in military operations, and highly qualified personnel with a broad spectrum of skills will be important. Sufficient capabilities in the areas of command, control and communications as well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as necessary force multipliers;

e. that at any time a limited but militarily significant proportion of ground, air and sea forces will be able to react as rapidly as necessary to a wide range of eventualities, including a short-notice attack on any Ally. Greater numbers of force elements will be available at appropriate levels of readiness to sustain prolonged operations, whether within or beyond Alliance territory, including through rotation of deployed forces. Taken together, these forces must also be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to contribute to deterrence and to defend against limited attacks on the Alliance;

f. that the Alliance must be able to build up larger forces, both in response to any fundamental changes in the security environment and for limited requirements, by reinforcement, by mobilizing reserves, or by reconstituting forces when necessary. This ability must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including potential long-term developments. It must take into account the possibility of substantial improvements in the readiness and capabilities of military forces on the periphery of the Alliance. Capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within and from Europe and North America will remain of critical importance, with a resulting need for a high degree of deployability, mobility and flexibility;

g. that appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and selectively, are necessary to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime;

h. that the Alliance's defense posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, which also pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. A balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defenses is needed;

i. that the Alliance's forces and infrastructure must be protected against terrorist attacks.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

54. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions. This requirement has implications for force structures, force and equipment levels; readiness, availability, and sustainability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up and mobilization capabilities. The aim should be to achieve an optimum balance between high readiness forces capable of beginning rapidly, and immediately as necessary, collective defense or non-Article 5 crisis response operations; forces at different levels of lower readiness to provide the bulk of those required for collective defense, for rotation of forces to sustain crisis response operations, or for further reinforcement of a particular region; and a longer-term build-up and augmentation capability for the worst case -- but very remote -- scenario of large scale operations for collective defense. A substantial proportion of Alliance forces will be capable of performing more than one of these roles.

55. Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational and joint nature of Alliance missions. Essential tasks will include controlling, protecting, and defending territory; ensuring the unimpeded use of sea, air, and land lines of communication; sea control and protecting the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based deterrent; conducting independent and combined air operations; ensuring a secure air environment and effective extended air defense; surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and electronic warfare; strategic lift; and providing effective and flexible command and control facilities, including deployable combined and joint headquarters.

56. The Alliance's defense posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defenses. As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO's borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning, and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.

57. Alliance strategy does not include a chemical or biological warfare capability. The Allies support universal adherence to the relevant disarmament regimes. But, even if further progress with respect to banning chemical and biological weapons can be achieved, defensive precautions will remain essential.

58. Given reduced overall force levels and constrained resources, the ability to work closely together will remain vital for achieving the Alliance's missions. The Alliance's collective defense arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure plays the key role, are essential in this regard. The various strands of NATO's defense planning need to be effectively coordinated at all levels in order to ensure the preparedness of the forces and supporting structures to carry out the full spectrum of their roles. Exchanges of information among the Allies about their force plans contribute to securing the availability of the capabilities needed for the execution of these roles. Consultations in case of important changes in national defense plans also remain of key importance. Cooperation in the development of new operational concepts will be essential for responding to evolving security challenges. The detailed practical arrangements that have been developed as part of the ESDI within the Alliance contribute to close allied co-operation without unnecessary duplication of assets and capabilities.

59. To be able to respond flexibly to possible contingencies and to permit the effective conduct of Alliance missions, the Alliance requires sufficient logistics capabilities, including transport capacities, medical support and stocks to deploy and sustain all types of forces effectively. Standardization will foster cooperation and cost-effectiveness in providing logistic support to allied forces. Mounting and sustaining operations outside the Allies' territory, where there may be little or no host-nation support, will pose special logistical challenges. The ability to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level able to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defense. This will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Forces of various kinds and at various levels of readiness will be capable of flexible employment in both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. This will require control of lines of communication, and appropriate support and exercise arrangements.

60. The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between the Alliance's military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.

61. The Alliance's ability to accomplish the full range of its missions will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO for the Allies concerned. Such forces, which are applicable to the full range of Alliance missions, demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defense; enhance Alliance cohesion; and reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the ESDI within the Alliance. Multinational forces, particularly those capable of deploying rapidly for collective defense or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defense resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions, an approach which underlies the implementation of the CJTF concept. For peace support operations, effective

multinational formations and other arrangements involving Partners will be valuable. In order to exploit fully the potential offered by multinational formations, improving interoperability, inter alia through sufficient training and exercises, is of the highest importance.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

62. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defense planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

64. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including reduced conventional force levels in Europe and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defense has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote. Since 1991, therefore, the Allies have taken a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment. These include a dramatic reduction of the types and numbers of NATO's sub-strategic forces including the elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles; a significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-armed forces; and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. NATO's nuclear forces no longer target any country. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link. These will consist of dual capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines.

PART V - CONCLUSION

65. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance's security and defense policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defense arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world the need for effective defense remains, but in reaffirming this commitment the Alliance will also continue making full use of every opportunity to help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free.

NATO at FIFTY Washington Summit

**For the United States of America For the Republic of Estonia For the Republic
of Latvia For the Republic of Lithuania
Washington D.C. January 16, 1998**



The U.S.-Russia Joint Commission

Fact sheet on the U.S.-Russia Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation

July 27, 1999

Founding: The U.S.-Russia Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation was established in 1993 by President Clinton and President Yeltsin to promote partnership between the United States and Russia based on a shared commitment to democracy and human rights, support for market economies and the rule of law, and international peace and stability.

Structure: The Commission is made up of committees and working groups in the areas of agribusiness; business development; defense conversion; energy; environment; health; law enforcement; nuclear issues; science and technology; small business; and space. The committees and working groups -- each co-chaired by senior U.S. and Russian officials -- work to identify and achieve clear, mutually beneficial objectives, and promote strong partnerships with private companies and non-government organizations. Committees schedule meetings throughout the year, and the full Commission gathers in plenary session to report to the Vice President and Prime Minister on the progress of specific projects and to discuss areas for further cooperation.

The Commission also provides a context for intensive discussions between the Vice President and the Prime Minister on a variety of sensitive bilateral and global issues. Topics include non-proliferation, arms control, and security issues as well as economics and structural reform. This channel has proved to be a useful supplement to U.S.- Russia summits in helping to advance some of the most important and sensitive aspects of our relations with Russia.

Past meetings: The Commission held 10 meetings between 1994 and March of 1998 with Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin as co-chairs. The most recent meeting of the Commission was held in July, 1998 with then-Prime Minister Kiriyenko. This session will be the first with Prime Minister Stepashin as co-chair.

Accomplishments: Since the U.S.-Russia Commission was founded in 1993, the Commission has helped reduce Russian trade barriers for U.S. products; promote cooperation in space; expedite major commercial projects; stem a diphtheria epidemic in Russia; design production-sharing legislation to allow U.S. investment in the Russian energy sector; and convert to civilian use military facilities formerly associated with the production of nuclear weapons. Under the auspices of the Commission, the U.S. and Russia also agreed to end the production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.

In 1998, before the tenth meeting of the Commission, Susan Eisenhower, Chair of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies, told the Washington Post: "[U.S.-Russia] relations right now are more strained than they have been in some time. For just that

reason, it would be a disaster if anybody called off the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. A dialogue wouldn't take place without that mechanism." The Gore-Chernomyrdin channel -- created through the Binational Commission -- also played an important role in winning the peace in Kosovo.



Baltic Action Plan

1999

U.S. objectives for the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the same as our goals for the rest of Central and Eastern Europe: integration into the evolving European security and economic structures; development of prosperous free market economies; and commitment to respect human rights and the rule of law.

U.S. policy is operating on three separate but parallel tracks. First, we seek to strengthen Baltic sovereignty and promote reforms by embedding the three states firmly in the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. We are working closely with the Nordic governments to generate regional cooperation, which involves both western integration and pragmatic cooperation with Russia.

Second, we are working bilaterally and multilaterally to encourage the development of normal, balanced relations with Russia.

Third, the U.S. is moving ahead on a range of bilateral actions to reassure the Baltic states that the U.S. commitment remains firm, and that we will continue to promote the development of the political, economic, and social infrastructures of the three states.

This three-track approach outlines our Baltic Action Plan, which was launched in August 1996. The measures included in the plan are designed to maintain the confidence and promote the integration of the Baltic states into the West. For the most part, the plan does not seek to establish new mechanisms, but builds on existing structures, such as PfP and the OSCE.

Bilaterally, the plan recommits the efforts of USG agencies that have a role in fostering stability, and promoting political and economic reform in the region.



The Northern European Initiative

1998

The Northern European Initiative (NEI) is a U.S. Government effort that brings together private, government, and non-governmental sector interest in the countries bordering on the Baltic Sea. By knitting these countries together, NEI strengthens Western institutions, trade and investment, security structures, and other priorities of Americana Euro-Atlantic policy.

NEI Unites the Baltic States, the Nordics, Russia, Poland, and Germany

The Northern European Initiative aims to:

- Help the Baltic states become the best candidates for participation in European and Atlantic institutions;
- Promote cooperation and integration between Northwest Russia and its Baltic Sea neighbors, and
- Work with the Nordic states, Russia, Poland, Germany, and the European Union to achieve these goals.

Regional Cooperation Creates Stability

The Baltic States aspire to join Western economic and security structures. The diverse cooperative projects of the NEI and the Baltic Charter help Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia think beyond their own borders and contribute to multilateral organizations.

Cross-border initiatives are underway in such areas as trade and investment, institution building, energy management, infrastructure enhancement, nuclear waste control, law enforcement, and civil society development that improve regional security and stability.

U.S. Contributes Expertise and Commitment

U.S. contributions of material support, expertise and diplomatic clout bring unique "value added" to regional organizations and efforts. For example, the recent launched great Lakes/Baltic Sea partnership applies U.S. experience and techniques to Baltic Sea environmental problems.

The U.S. values its many chances to share information and implement ideas in cooperation with regional organizations, including the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (in which the U.S. is an observer) and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). Broader European groups such as the EU and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are also effective partners for pursuing goals.

Russia Benefits from Integration

The goal with respect to Russia is to demonstrate that greater integration is a "win/win" situation, increasing the prosperity and security of each nation in the region. The U.S. invites Russia to work together within the NEI to improve the economy and environment of the region while building mutual confidence.

U.S. and Baltic States Work Bilaterally for Prosperity and Security

The U.S.-Baltic Charter, signed in January 1998 by President Clinton and the three Baltic Presidents, enshrines the shared vision of a Europe whole and free and the place of the Baltic states within that vision. The Charter guides U.S. bilateral relations, offering a framework for cooperation that includes bilateral working groups on economics and on security, and a joint Partnership Commission chaired by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott.

Priority Areas under NEI

As the Northern European Initiative continues to evolve and develop, a number of areas of concentration have emerged. They can be grouped loosely as six priority areas: business promotion, civil society, environment, energy, law enforcement and public health.

Business Promotion: In support of U.S.-Baltic Charter objectives, American Embassies in the region have developed an economic -commercial plan to support American businesses interested in the region. The Charter's Partnership Council also has a business component.

Civil Society emphasizes rule of law and other issues. The U.S. helps support the new Riga Graduate School of Law, which will attract students from all these Baltic republics. The Baltic American Partnership Fund will help speed the Baltic transition to democracy and market economies. Other projects are directed at training in business and public administration. A new activity will focus on training women in the region.

Energy is a pillar for promoting the region's economic transformation and growth. Sound, safe, and prudent management of the energy sector is critical for the region's environmental security. U.S. interests include nuclear power plant safety and supporting restructuring of national power systems on commercially viable grounds.

Environment activity covers both nuclear and non-nuclear areas. A Nuclear Waste Interagency Task Force focuses on Russian nuclear waste in Northwestern Russia. Other environmental projects include the Great Lakes/Baltic Sea Partnership.

Law Enforcement cooperation focuses on the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Task Force on Organized Crime. The U.S. also supports an international police training center in Poland.

Public Health experts from the U.S. and Nordic states are involved in efforts to combat drug-resistant TB in Russia and the Baltics.